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This paper studies dynamic, endogenous institutional change. We introduce the class of dynamic
political games (DPGs), dynamic games in which future political aggregation rules are decided under
current ones, and the resulting institutional choices do not aﬀect payoﬀs or technology directly. A
companion paper (Lagunoﬀ (2005b)) establishes existence of Markov Perfect equilibria of dynamic
political games. The present paper examines issues of stability and reform when such equilibria exist.
Which environments tend toward institutional stability? Which tend toward reform? We show that
when political rules are dynamically consistent and private sector decisions are inessential, reform
never occurs: all political rules are stable. Roughly, private sector decisions are inessential if any
feasible “social” continuation payoﬀ can achieved by public sector decisions alone. More generally, we
identify suﬃcient conditions for stability and reform in terms of recursive self selection and recursive
self denial, incentive compatibility concepts that treat the rules themselves as “players” who can
strategically delegate future policy-making authority to diﬀerent institutional types. These ideas are
illustrated in an example of dynamic public goods provision.
JEL Codes: C73,D72, D74
Key Words and Phrases: Recursive, dynamic political games, institutional reform, stability,
dynamically consistent rules, inessential, recursive self selection.
∗Department of Economics, Georgetown University, Washington DC 20057 USA. 202 687-1510.
lagunofr@georgetown.edu. http://www.georgetown.edu/lagunoff/lagunoff.htm . Initial Draft: De-
cember, 2004. This project began while the author visited Johns Hopkins University and the W. Allen Wallis
Institute of Political Economy at the University of Rochester. I am grateful for their hospitality. I also thank
Luca Anderlini, Jimmy Chan, William Jack, Jim Jordan, Mark Stegeman, and seminar participants at Berke-
ley, Cal Tech, Georgetown, Penn State, Toronto, VPI, and the Latin American and North American Meetings
of the Econometric Society for their helpful comments on an earlier draft.
11 Introduction
Reforms of political institutions are common throughout history. They come in many varieties.
In some cases, the reforms correspond to changes in the voting franchise. Periodic expansions
of voting rights occurred in governments of ancient Athens (700- 338BC), the Roman Republic
(509BC-25AD), and most of Western Europe in the 19th and early 20th centuries, to name
just a few examples.1
In other cases, modiﬁcations were made to the voting procedure itself. Medieval Venice
(1032-1300), for instance, gradually lowered the required voting threshold from unanimity
to a simple majority in its Citizens’ Council. Nineteenth century Prussia, where votes were
initially weighted by one’s wealth, eventually equalized the weights across all citizens. The
U.S. changed its rules under the 17th Amendment to require direct election of senators.
In still other instances, the scope of a government’s authority changed. For example,
England and France privatized common land during the 16th and 17th century enclosure
movement thus reducing scope for rules governing the commons.2 The U.S. government, on
the other hand, increased its scope under the 16th Amendment by legalizing federal income
tax in 1913.
Numerous historical examples suggest that institutional change is often gradual and in-
cremental. Consider the progress of reforms in the Roman Republic. In 509BC, the Senate
and Assembly were founded; in 494 BC the Patricians conceded the right of the plebs (the
“commoners”) to participate in the election of magistrates; in 336 BC one of the consulships
became available for election by plebians; and in 287 BC Hortensian Law was introduced which
gave resolutions in the plebian council the force of law. Gradual reform also characterized
expansion of voting rights in 19th century England. In 1830, the voting franchise restricted
to 2% of the population. In 1832, the First Reform Act extended the franchise to 3.5% of
population. The Second Reform Act of 1867 extended it to some 7.7%. By 1884 it had been
extended to 15% of population. Universal suﬀrage only passed in 1928 (see Finer (1997).
The objective in this paper is to understand how and why institutional reform occurs.
Most basically, which environments tend toward institutional stability? Which environments
admit change? What are the relevant forces that drive this change?
To address these questions, we posit a broad framework that endogenizes the process
of institutional change. We introduce a class of inﬁnite horizon stochastic games in which
the process of change is recursive: rules for choosing public decisions in period t + 1 are,
themselves, objects of choice in period t. The process is also instrumental: institutions do
not aﬀect payoﬀs or technology directly. We call games in this class dynamic political games
1See Fine (1983), Finer (1997), and Fleck and Hanssen (2003).
2See MacFarlane (1978) and Dahlman (1980).
1(DPGs).
In a DPG, rules for choosing public decisions are themselves part of the decision process.
At each date t, private and public sector decisions jointly determine the date (t+1) distribution
of “economic” and “political” states of the world. Economic states are substantive parameters
that aﬀect preferences and technology directly. Political states are “procedural” parameters
that characterize the explicit political rule for determining public sector decisions. If, for
example, the current political rule is a simple majority rule, then the feasible set of outcomes
of majority rule is the set of Condorcet Winners — the choices which cannot be defeated by
any alternative choice in a majority vote.
We study the Markovian equilibria of dynamic political games. A Markovian equilibrium
in a DPG is a collection of state-contingent private and public sector decision rules such that
(a) the private sector rule for each individual is optimal for him in each period and in each
state, and (b) public sector decisions are consistent with the prevailing political rule in each
period and in each state. The choice of restricting to Markovian equilibria follows the general
rule of thumb: in an economy-wide context, the participants are less apt to coordinate on non
payoﬀ-relevant history than they would if they were in a small group.
A companion paper (Lagunoﬀ, (2005b) ) establishes existence of Markov Perfect equilibria
for a class dynamic political games. The present paper examines properties of these equilibria.
In particular, we ask: when do institutional reforms occur, or alternatively, when are rules
stable over time?
By deﬁnition, a political rule admits reform whenever next period’s political rule is chosen
to be diﬀerent than the present one. A rule is stable whenever no reform occurs. Our main
result (Theorem 1) is that any political rule that satisﬁes two simple conditions, dynamic
consistency and private sector inessentiality, is stable in every equilibrium. In other words,
institutional reform never occurs if these two conditions are satisﬁed.
The ﬁrst condition is a straightforward extension of the dynamic consistency idea in an
individual decision problem. A political rule is dynamically consistent if it is rationalized by a
time separable social welfare function that does not vary directly with the economic state in
any period. Most dynamic voting games that admit the same median voter each period are
dynamically consistent. However, voting models in which orderings of voters change through
time may not be.
According to the second condition, the private sector is inessential in the current political
rule if for any private sector decision, any social continuation that is feasible tomorrow can
always be reached or exceeded today by a public sector decision. Hence, private decisions
are inessential if their eﬀects on social welfare can always be replaced by those of the public
sector.
2The intuition for the result may be seen in the special case of endogenous voting rights.
An inﬂuential argument of Acemoglu and Robinson (2000, 2001) asserts that the elites of 19th
century Europe chose to extend the voting franchise because policy concessions alone could
not “buy oﬀ” the external threat of an uprising. In other words, franchise extension could
only occur because the external threat (from the private sector) was essential. Of course, this
condition provides only a necessary, not a suﬃcient condition for a reform such as a franchise
expansion. Jack and Lagunoﬀ (2003) display Acemoglu-Robinson logic as a special case in
a recursive model in which gradual extension of the voting franchise is possible. The result
therefore helps to make sense of their logic in a larger context; it identiﬁes some necessary
features of an environment in order for institutional change to occur.
More generally, by ﬁxing a continuation value and an economic state in each period, one
can interpret play of the dynamic political game in that period as a distinct normal form
game. A rule is recursively self-selected (RSS) if, in this auxiliary game, the current rule never
chooses to “delegate” decision authority to another rule for the subsequent period only. A
rule is recursively self-denied (RSD) if it delegates authority to some other rule. Recursive
self-selection and self-denial are institutional incentive constraints that treat each distinct rule
as an institutional “player” in the induced normal form game with private individuals.
Recursive self-selection bears some relation to “self-selected rules” in the static social choice
models of Koray (2000) and Barbera and Jackson (2000), and also to the inﬁnite regress model
of choice of rules by Lagunoﬀ (1992). These all posit social orderings on the rules themselves
based on the outcomes that these rules prescribe. Rules that “select themselves” do so on
basis of selecting the same outcome as original rule. The present model has two diﬀerences.
First, institutional choice occurs in real time — next period’s rule is chosen by the present
one. This makes possible an analysis of explicit dynamics of change. Second, the present
model is more concrete; the trade-oﬀs are explicitly derived from the interaction of economic
fundamentals in the public and private sectors.
We show that recursively self-selected (RSS) rules are stable (Theorem 2). The converse,
however, does not hold: there may be stable rules that are not RSS. In these instances, Rule
A may choose not to delegate to Rule B, even though Rule A is recursively self-denied (RSD)
by Rule B. Why? Because Rule B, with its decision authority, would subsequently delegate
to Rule C which is unattractive from A’s point of view. Given these intransitivities, Rule A
remains stable. Consequently, we show in Theorem 2 that a rule admits institutional reform
if either it is RSD by another RSS rule, or, alternatively, if it is RSD by every other rule.
The usefulness of RSS and RSD are illustrated in an example, based on a parametric
example of Jack and Lagunoﬀ (2003), of dynamic public goods provision that requires both
private and public inputs. We show that there exists an equilibrium that converges globally
to a steady state political rule. This rule is uniquely RSS. We show that every other political
rule admits reform. In these cases, a time consistency problem arises when the current rule
3produces policies ill-adapted to private contributions. To alleviate this problem a reform
occurs when the current rule commits future policy-making authority to another rule.
Ideally, we eventually hope to obtain a full characterization of those environments that
admit reform and those that do not. Our results provide only suﬃcient conditions for each.
Nevertheless, the notions of inessentiality and self-selection/denial seem more representative
of general ideas than their application suggests.
There is a modest literature on dynamic, endogenous political institutions.3 Informal
discussions in North (1981) and Ostrom (1990) both hint at recursivity in the process of insti-
tutional change. In more formal work, Messner and Polborn (2002) examine an OLG model
of endogenous changes to future voting rules under current ones. Lagunoﬀ (2001) studies a
dynamic recursive model of endogenously chosen civil liberties. Greif and Laitin (2004) model
institutions as equilibrium outcomes in a repeated game. Acemoglu and Robinson (2000,
2001) examine endogenous voting rights in a dynamic game. In their model an enfranchised
player representing “the elite” can choose in any period whether to make a once-and-for-all
extension of voting rights to the other player representing “the masses”. The extension of
rights in their model is motivated by the elite’s desire to head oﬀ social unrest. Models in
which endogenous extensions of voting rights are gradual and incremental are proposed by
Justman and Gradstein (1999), Roberts (1998, 1999), Barbera, Maschler, and Shalev (2001),
Jack and Lagunoﬀ (2003), and Gradstein (2003).
In certain respects, the model of Jack and Lagunoﬀ (2003) is a prototype for the present
framework. It shares the feature in common with the present framework that the choice of rule
is both recursive and instrumental. The current paper extends their framework to produce
new results and examine institutional choices other than voting rights. DPGs admit a broad
array of institutional changes including changes in the voting rule (majority vs supermajority
rules), changes in voting rights (e.g. larger vs smaller voting franchise), and changes in the
scope of the public sector (e.g., expansions vs contractions of regulatory authority).
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we present a less formal version of the
model in order to highlight issues of institutional stability. Section 3 introduces the class
of political rules. Political rules are the natural objects of choice in a recursive model of
endogenous institutions. An “equilibrium” in the dynamic political game combines standard
Markov Perfection in private decisions with a political ﬁxed point requirement for public
decisions. Section 4 gives the ﬁrst main result — a set of suﬃcient conditions for institutional
stability. Section 5 introduces RSS and RSD concepts. Section 6 gives an illustrative example.
Section 7 summarizes the results, and Section 8 is an Appendix with the proofs of the main
results.
3In focusing attention on dynamic models, I neglect a larger literature on static models of endogenous
political institutions such as, for example, Lizzeri and Persico (2002) and Aghion, Alesina, and Trebbi (2002).
42 An Introductory Pure Public Sector Model
A less formal, “stripped down” version of the model is presented in this Section to highlight
some basic issues in recursive institutional choice.
A society consists of a set I = {1,...,n} of inﬁnitely lived individuals, at each date
t =1 ,2,..., this society must collectively choose policy pt from a compact feasible set P. The
stage payoﬀs of each individual depend on this policy and on a state variable ωt drawn from
a set Ω. Write ui(ωt,p t) to denote the payoﬀ of individual i ∈ I at date t given state ωt and
policy pt. The technology determines how current states and policies pin down distributions
over future states. For example, ωt could be distribution of date t incomes across individuals
and pt an income tax schedule. For now, omit (notationally) private sector behavior such as
individuals’ savings decisions.4
Each period, a political institution aggregates policy preferences to determine that period’s
policy pt. We examine a scenario in which this institution itself is part of the decision problem.
Let θt denote a parameter that determines a political rule. A political rule summarizes the
political process by which public decisions are made. To simplify things for this example,
suppose that there are two possible political rules which we categorize as “democracy” and
“dictatorship.” Formally, let θt ∈{ θA,θ B} where, if θt = θA then the policy is determined by
a majority vote, and if θt = θB then the policy pt is imposed by a “dictator,” whom we assume
to be Individual i = 1. In particular, θ = θA means that feasible political choices must be
Condorcet Winners — outcomes that dominate any alternative in a pairwise majority vote.
By contrast, θ = θB means the only feasible political choices are those that maximize the
payoﬀ of individual i =1 .
The formal deﬁnitions of aggregation under θA and θB will be deﬁned momentarily. The
important aspect, however, is that the prevailing political rule at date t determines both the
policy pt and the subsequent political rule, θt+1.
The composite state at date t is denoted by st =( ωt,θ t), consisting of the economic state
and the political rule. A strategy is a pair (ψ,µ ) of Markov decision functions that select a
politically feasible choice in each state. Given st, ψ determines the policy pt = ψ(st) while
µ determines next period’s political rule θt+1 = µ(st). The institutional strategy µ is of
particular interest since it describes a recursive process of institutional change.
The pair (ψ,µ ) produces a public sector decision each period given by the pair (pt,θ t+1).
The public sector decision includes the choice of institution for the following period. An
individual i’s recursive payoﬀ function of the public sector decision in state st is
Ui(st; ψ,µ )(pt,θ t+1) ≡ (1 − δ)ui(ωt,p t)+δ
Z
Vi(st+1; ψ,µ )dq(ωt+1| ωt,p t) (1)
4Private sector behavior will be introduced in the next Section.
5where δ is the discount factor, q denotes the stochastic transition function mapping current
states and policies into probability distributions over future states, and Vi is i’s continuation
payoﬀ given policy rule ψ.5 Each individual therefore has payoﬀ function Ui(st;ψ)(·) in (1)
deﬁned over (pt,θ t+1) pairs of public decisions. By construction, we must have,
Ui(st; ψ,µ )(ψ(st),µ(st)) = Vi(st; ψ,µ ).
A proﬁle of payoﬀ functions is denoted U(st;ψ)=( Ui(st;ψ))n
i=1. Given any such proﬁle, the
political rules are summarized by a mapping C with:
C( U(st;ψ,µ ),s t)=

    
    
set of Condorcet Winners if θt = θA
argmax
p,θ0 U1(st;ψ,µ )(p,θ
0)i f θt = θB
The operator C describes the institutional constraints.6 Given these constraints, the strat-
egy pair (ψ,µ ) must satisfy the following “political ﬁxed point” problem.
(ψ(st),µ(st)) ∈ C(U(st; ψ,µ ),s t), ∀st (2)
The companion paper of Lagunoﬀ (2005b) focuses on ﬁnding solutions to the political ﬁxed
point problem. If, indeed, satisfactory solutions may be found, the model can determine if and
when institutional change takes place. For instance, when is it true that dictators relinquish
power, i.e., µ(ωt,θ B)=θA? When is it true that democracies turn over power to dictators,
i.e., µ(ωt,θ A)=θB? In certain cases, the answer is available.
Proposition Let (ψ,µ ) be a political ﬁxed point such that in state θA, there is some voter
(e.g., the median voter) for whom the Condorcet Winning choice is this voter’s most preferred
decision for each ω. Then each political state θ ∈{ θA,θ B} is politically stable in the sense
that µ(ω,θ)=θ for every ω.
The proof is omitted since the result is a special case of Theorem 1 also in Section 4.7
The intuition is: by maintaining the current political state, the current pivotal decision maker
(either the dictator in θB or the pivotal voter in θA) holds on to power. By doing so, the
decision problem reduces to a single agent dynamic programming problem. It is well known
5The transition q is assumed to satisfy the standard measurability assumptions.
6Recall that the set of Condorcet Winners is deﬁned by all pairs (pt,θ t+1) that satisfy: for all (ˆ p, ˆ θ),




7A special case of this result also appears in Jack and Lagunoﬀ (2003).
6in such problems that the resulting sequence of decisions is optimal from the decision maker’s
point of view.
The Proposition makes use of two critical assumptions, one explicit, the other implicit.
The explicit assumption is that in either political rule, the identity of the pivotal decision
maker does not vary over time and states. To get a better sense of this explicit requirement,
consider these examples.
Example 2a. Suppose n is odd and the stage game payoﬀs at date t are given by ui =
ωt + yi(1 − pt), ∀i where yi is a ﬁxed asset such as land holdings, pt is a ﬂat tax on income,
and ωt is a public good. The public good in period t +1 is produced (deterministically) from
tax revenues in period t according to ωt+1 =( pt
P
j yj)γ,γ < 1. Individuals’ land holdings
are ordered: y1 <y 2 < ···<y n. With these payoﬀs, it is not hard to show that the Condorcet
Winner is the preferred policy of the voter with median land value, ym, and the identity of
this individual never changes over time. Hence, it is easy to show that ψ(ω,θ)=Ay−1/(1−γ)
m
if θ = θA and = Ay
−1/(1−γ)
1 if θ = θB, and where A =( γδ(
P
j yj)γ)1/(1−γ) is a constant. In
either case, the political rule is stable since the pivotal decision maker never has an incentive
to delegate decision authority to a diﬀerent individual whose implicit preferences over policy
is diﬀerent than his own.
Example 2b. Now suppose that Example 1a is slightly modiﬁed so that assignments of land
to individuals vary over time. To make the point as simply as possible, suppose that land
rotates deterministically: in period t, individual i has land value yi+t, modulo n.8 With land
rotation, the pivotal decision maker in the majority rule institution, θA, also rotates. In this
case, the government is akin to a dynamically inconsistent decision maker, whose preferences
over income streams changes over time. However, whenever Individual 1 has the median land
value ym under this rule, he is pivotal at that date, and so he will surely choose θB, thus
remaining the dictator from that point onward. By choosing θB, Individual 1 can commit to
installing himself as the permanent, dynamically consistent decision maker thereafter. It may
also be the case that, say, Individual 2 with land y2 close to y1 may choose θB (receiving a
“close-by” tax rate) rather than continue the rotation scheme of θA. In any case, θB is stable,
while θA admits reform.
The implicit assumption is, of course, that there is only one decision maker in the game
at each date. In particular, there is no private sector, no other individuals to make choices
to oﬀset the pivotal decision maker’s choices. In the absence of a private sector, there is no
time-consistency problem here. Sequentially rational decisions are optimal.
Signiﬁcantly, the absence private decisions is the deﬁning feature of a totalitarian gov-
ernment. This is the traditional deﬁnition, according to which inalienable rights of private
8If, for instance, t = 154 and n = 40, then i = 5 has income y39.
7individuals do not exist. Hence, even democracies can be totalitarian if all choices are ﬁltered
through the voting mechanism. The Proposition therefore asserts that both of these political
rules are stable in a totalitarian state! Naturally, most governments are not thought to be
totalitarian to this extreme, and so we introduce a private sector in the general model that
follows.
3 The General Model
Here we introduce the general model. Our speciﬁcation adds both private sector decisions
and a fairly arbitrary space of political institutions to the existing framework of the previous
section.
3.1 The Private Sector
We ﬁrst introduce private sector decisions. Let eit denote i’s private decision at date t, chosen
from a compact feasible set E. A proﬁle of private decisions is et =( e1t,...,e nt ). These
decisions may capture any number of activities, including labor eﬀort, savings, or investment
activities. They may also include “non-economic” activities such as religious worship or one’s
participation in a social revolt. The distinction between eit and pt is that while the latter is
collectively determined, the former is chosen individually.
To express the dependence of payoﬀs and technology in private sector decisions, let ui(ωt,e t,p t)
denote i’s stage payoﬀ and let q(B| ωt,e t,p t) denote the probability that ωt+1 belongs to the
(Borel measurable) subset B ⊆ Ω, both given the economic state ωt, the private decision pro-
ﬁle et, and the policy pt. Given that economic states evolve according to q, each individual’s





t(1 − δ) ui(ωt,e t,p t )
#
(3)
Next, we specify a set Θ that represents the feasible political institutions. Obviously,
there are many more institutions that one might consider than merely “dictatorships” and
“democracies”. We will assume only that Θ is a compact subset of a Euclidean space. As
before, st =( ωt,θ t) denotes the composite state at date t. Let S =Ω ×Θ denote the composite
state space. Finally, let s0 =( ω0,θ 0) denote the initial state.
We now complete our speciﬁcation of strategies and dynamic payoﬀs. To make the theory
tractable, we restrict attention to Markov strategies. Such strategies only encode the payoﬀ-
8relevant states of the game. Consequently, individuals are not required to coordinate on the
history of past play.
Recall that ψ : S → P and µ : S → Θ describe the policy and institutional strategies,
respectively. Together they constitute the public sector strategies.A private sector strategy
for individual i is a function σi : S → Ei that prescribes private action eit = σi(st) in state st.
Let σ =( σ1,...,σ n). The strategy proﬁle is therefore summarized by the triple
private sector proﬁle
| {z } policy strategy
| {z } institutional strategy
| {z }
π ≡ ( σ, ψ, µ )
Individual i’s recursive payoﬀ in st =( ωt,θ t) given proﬁle π is deﬁned by:
Vi(st; π)=( 1 − δ)ui(ωt,σ(st),ψ(st))+δ
Z
Vi(ωt+1,µ(st);π)dq(ωt+1| ωt,σ(st),ψ(st) ) (4)
The function V depends on and varies with arbitrary Markov strategy proﬁles π =( σ,ψ,µ ).
Along an equilibrium path (deﬁned below), the function Vi deﬁnes a Bellman’s equation for
citizen i.
Individual i’s recursive payoﬀ function in st =( ωt,θ t) given proﬁle π is a function Ui(st,π):
P × Θ → I R deﬁned by
Ui(st,π)(pt,θ t+1) ≡ (1 − δ)ui(ωt,σ(st),p t)+δ
Z
Vi(ωt+1,θ t+1;π)dq(ωt+1| ωt,σ(st),p t ) (5)
3.2 Political Rules
From Equation (5), let U(st,π)=( Ui(st,π)) i∈I denote a proﬁle of recursive payoﬀ functions.
An index θ describes a political institution that maps proﬁles U(st,π) into public sector
decisions. However, it is more useful to deﬁne a political institution that maps from arbitrary
preference proﬁles — not just proﬁles U(st,π) generated from the Markov strategies π in the
dynamic model.
Following standard conventions, we will ﬁnd it useful to drop time subscripts, and adopt
instead the use of primes, e.g., θ0 to denote subsequent period’s variables, θt+1, and so on. An
arbitrary payoﬀ function is denoted by vi, expressing the payoﬀ vi(p,θ0) over current policy
p and next period’s political state, θ0. In the dynamic model of the previous section, vi is
a notational shorthand for vi(p,θ0)=Ui(s; π)(p,θ0). Let V denote the set of all proﬁles,
v =( v1,...,v n).
9A class of political rules corresponds to state-contingent social choice correspondence
C : V×S →→ P × Θ
that associates to each state and each proﬁle, v, of payoﬀ functions, a set C(v,s) of public
decisions. If (p,θ0) ∈ C(v,s), then (p,θ0) is a feasible public sector decision under C. Each
particular political rule in the class C is given by C(·,s).
The construction of C is broad enough to cover a large variety of institutional reforms,
including those mentioned in the Introductory Section. Some examples below illustrate the
degree of breadth (the Reader who prefers to skip the details of the examples can proceed,
without losing the main ideas, to Section 3.3.)
Example 3a. Voting over the Voting Rule.
Supermajority rules are widely used, particularly to eﬀect large or constitutional changes
in policy. In formal work, Messner and Polborn (2002) examine endogenous supermajority
rules in an OLG setting. The recursive approach in the present framework entails that current
super-majority voting rule determines which supermajority rule is used in the future. In the
present framework, operator C can capture this idea as follows. In each state s =( ω,θ),
the political state θ identiﬁes the fraction, θ ≥ 1/2 of individuals required to pass a public
decision. Let (p,θ0) ∈ C(v,s) if for all (ˆ p, ˆ θ0),
|{i ∈ I : vi(ˆ p, ˆ θ
0) >v i(p,θ
0)}| ≤ θn
The example can be modiﬁed further so that the supermajority required for changing the
policy is distinct from the supermajority for changing the current political rule (as in the U.S.
constitution): let θ =( θa,θ b), whereby θa is the supermajority required to determine policy,
while θb is the supermajority required to determine the subsequent rule. Then (p,θ0) ∈ C(v,s)
if, for all (ˆ p, ˆ θ0), EITHER
|{i ∈ I : vi(ˆ p, ˆ θ
0) >v i(p, ˆ θ
0)}| ≤ θ
an OR |{i ∈ I : vi(ˆ p, ˆ θ
0) >v i(ˆ p,θ
0)}| ≤ θ
bn
Example 3b. Voting over the Voting Franchise.
Consider the case of an endogenous voting franchise. The political state θ identiﬁes the
subset of individuals who currently possess the right to vote (the voting franchise). The
chosen public decision is the one that is majority preferred within this restricted group. Each
restricted voting franchise today uses a majority vote to determine what group of individuals
have the right to vote tomorrow. Hence, the current voting franchise decides on a new voting
franchise in the following period. This mechanism for change captures the phenomenon of
franchise expansion which occurred throughout Europe in the 19th century and in which new
10groups of voters were “let in.” Typically, these expansions took the form of relaxed wealth or
property qualiﬁcations for voting. Formally, Θ ⊇ 2I, and let (p,θ0) ∈ C(v,s) if for all (ˆ p, ˆ θ0),






This case conforms precisely to the political model of Jack and Lagunoﬀ (2003), but it also
generalizes earlier models of endogenous enfranchisement by Justman and Gradstein (1999)
and Acemoglu and Robinson (2000, 2001). In both of these models, Θ = {S,I},S⊂ I. The
interpretation is that an elite group S chooses either to maintain the status quo, or to make an
irreversible, all-or-nothing extension of the vote to the entire population, I. In the Acemglu-
Robinson model, the extension represents a commitment to lower taxes on the peasantry. The
commitment is credible since the identity of the median voter is permanently altered. In the
Justman-Gradstein OLG model a franchise extension is assumed to lower production costs.
The key diﬀerences with both models here is that the process is potentially gradual (partial
extensions are possible) and potentially reversible. In contrast to the Justman-Gradstein
approach, the institutional decision here does not enter into either technology or preferences
directly.9
An important subclass of these rules is the class of Delegated Dictatorship rules studied
in Jack and Lagunoﬀ (2003). Under these rules, θ varies only over the singletons {i}, i =
1,...,n. In each such state, the current dictator chooses his most preferred policy and then
delegates the decision to possibly a new dictator in the future. If the date t describes the
length of a generation, then delegated dictator rule might be useful for describing a particular
process of dynastic succession in which the king anoints his own successor.
Example 3c. Voting over the Scope of Government.
Finally, consider an endogenous choice of public sector scope. Each period, society draws
a line between private and public sector. The political state therefore identiﬁes the domain
of public decisions. Privatization of public land, for example, reduce the public sector while
broadening surveillance capabilities of police increases it. Formally, we set θ ⊂ P so that θ
denotes the set of feasible policies. Let (p,θ0) ∈ C(v,s)i fp ∈ θ and for all (ˆ p, ˆ θ0) satisfying
ˆ p ∈ θ,






9This last attribute — whether or not institutional choice is an instrumental choice — also diﬀerentiates
the present approach from the club choice models of Roberts (1998, 1999), and Barbera, Maschler, and Shalev
(2001).
113.3 Dynamic Political Games











The class of dynamic political games (DPGs) constitutes a broad set of problems in which
institutional changes occur endogenously and incrementally. The “economic structure,” i.e.,
(ui)i∈I,q,E,P and Ω is found in any standard stochastic game. The addition is the “political
structure” given by Θ and C. The class of political rules is described by operator C. The
operator C is deﬁned on the proﬁles of recursive payoﬀ functions in each state. In turn, these
payoﬀ functions (given by (5) ) depend on future strategies.
For tractability we restrict attention in the rest of the paper to dynamic political games G
that satisfy: Θ, P, and E are all compact, convex subsets of Euclidian spaces, Ω is a convex
set, and ui and q are continuous in (ω,e,p).
Deﬁnition 1 An Equilibrium of a dynamic political game, G, is a proﬁle π =( σ,ψ,µ )o f
Markov strategies such that for all states s =( ω,θ),
(a) Private decision rationality: For each citizen i, and each private strategy ˆ σi,
Vi(s; π) ≥ Vi(s; σ−i, ˆ σi,ψ,µ) (6)
(b) Political ﬁxed points: The public decision pair (ψ(s),µ(s) ) satisﬁes the political ﬁxed
point problem
(ψ(s),µ(s)) ∈ C (U(s,π),s) (7)
Part (a) is the standard Markov Perfection property of a stochastic game. Private sector
actions are individually optimal in each state. Part (b) asserts the existence of political
ﬁxed points. Public sector decisions are required to be consistent with political rules in
the class C. In keeping with the standard deﬁnition of a stochastic game, both types of
decisions are simultaneous. Therefore, an equilibrium of a DPG requires Markov Perfection
from individuals’ private sector choices and recursive consistency of public sector choices with
a political rule. The latter requirement must hold in each state s, and so the consistency
condition also satisﬁes a “perfection” constraint.
124 Institutional Reform vs Institutional Stability
The term institutional reform refers to the idea that institutions are deliberately modiﬁed.
Given an equilibrium π =( σ,ψ,µ ), a political state θ is said to admit institutional reform in
π if there exists a (set of positive measure) ω such that µ(ω,θ) 6= θ. Alternatively, a political
state θ is institutionally stable in π if it does not admit reform, i.e, if µ(ω,θ)=θ for (almost)
every ω.
When do political rules admit reform? When are they stable? In this Section, we give
some preliminary answers that depend on exogenous features of the dynamic political game.
Our main result, stated just below, rests on two assumptions: dynamic consistency of rules
and inessentiality of the private sector (underlined in Theorem 1). We ﬁrst state the result
without deﬁning these two terms. The remainder of this Section then deﬁnes and discusses
the importance of these assumptions, and elaborates upon the logic of the result. The proof
is in the Appendix.
Theorem 1 Consider a dynamic political game in which the class, C, of political rules is
single valued. Suppose that
(i) C is dynamically consistent; and
(ii) private decisions are inessential in some rule θ.
Then θ is institutionally stable in every equilibrium.
4.1 Dynamically Consistent Rules
It is well known what is meant for an individual decision maker to be dynamically consistent.
Long taken for granted in decision models, dynamic consistency presumes that future decision
makers’ points of view coincide with that of the present decision maker if the latter were to
called upon to make the decision in that future period. A large literature has emerged recently
to evaluate dynamically inconsistent decision-making from an individual’s perspective. What
does it mean for a rule to be dynamically consistent?
The most natural deﬁnition is one in which the political rule “inherits” the dynamic
consistency of the individual participants. In turn, this entails that the political rule can be
rationalized by a dynamically consistent social welfare criterion.
Formally, a class of rules C is (partially) rationalized by a social welfare function F :
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By itself, rationalizing C by a social welfare function imposes very little restriction. Clearly,
the Delegated Dictator Rule (Example 3b) is rationalized by vθ where θ identiﬁes the dic-
tator. When political rules are voting rules, as in Examples 3a-3c, then two well known
conditions, either single peaked preferences or order restriction, imply that C is rationalized
by the preferences of a Median Voter.10
Deﬁning dynamic consistency of a rule is now straightforward. Consider any additively
separable public sector payoﬀs: payoﬀs function of the time separable form, v(pt,θ t+1)=
(1 − δ)v1(pt)+δ
R
ωt+1 v2(ωt+1,θ t+1)dη where η is a probability measure on the states ωt+1.
(Clearly, dynamic payoﬀs in the present model satisfy this requirement). A class of political
rules, C, will be said to be dynamically consistent if it is partially rationalized by a continuous
























This deﬁnition embodies two critical properties. First, F is time and state separable and
linearly homogeneous in the discount weights (1−δ,δ).11 Second, F does not vary directly with
the economic state. Consequently, each political state θ is uniquely associated with a political
rule. Both properties are needed to guarantee that the rate of intertemporal substitution
between the current period payoﬀ and next period coincides with the rate of substitution
between any other pair of successive payoﬀ-dates.
It is easy to see that the class of rules in Example 2a is dynamically consistent, while the
class in Example 2b is not. The Examples 2a-3c are only dynamically consistent in particular
circumstances (see Lagunoﬀ (2005b), Theorem 2). Nevertheless, most dynamic models of
government policy implicitly maintain assumptions of dynamic consistency.12
4.2 An Inessential Private Sector
In the Pure Public Sector Model of Section 2, it was shown that equilibria never admit
institutional reform. It seems clear from that model that the private sector matters somehow.
Here, we try to make clear what this means.
10The ﬁrst conditions originated with Arrow (1951) and Black (1958). The second is due Rothstein (1990),
although similar results can be found in applications of single crossing properties by Roberts (1977) and by
Gans and Smart (1996).
11Broader deﬁnitions of dynamic consistency do not require the linear homogeneity in discount factor re-
quirement. The results here are amenable to a more general deﬁnition, but at a cost in transparency.
12Two exceptions are Krusell, Kuruscu, and Smith (2002) and Lagunoﬀ (2005a), both of which examine
policies chosen by dynamically inconsistent governments.
14First, we maintain the assumption C is rationalized by some F. However, dynamic con-
sistency is not required for any of the subsequent deﬁnitions.
Next, the following notation is required. For any initial economic state ω,afeasible
continuation payoﬀ proﬁle is a measurable function x :Ω→ [0,K)n for which there exists an
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where E is the expectation on {ωt} induced by the transition law q. Feasible continuations
are those that could be reached by any pair of Markov strategies, equilibrium or otherwise.
Now given any feasible continuation x, deﬁne for each i,





Let H =( Hi)n
i=1. Notice that H(·,e,p,x) is itself a feasible continuation proﬁle.
Deﬁnition 2 Fix the political state θ. Formally, we will say that the private sector decisions
are inessential in θ if the following holds for any economic state ω, and any feasible continu-
ation proﬁle, x: for every private sector proﬁle e there exists a public sector decision p such
that
F (H(ω,e,p,x),s ) ≥ F (x(ω),s ) (8)
We refer to F (x(ω),s )a safeasible social continuation in state s =( ω,θ). In words,
private sector decisions are inessential in θ if in any economic state and for any private sector
decision, any feasible social continuation in any date t +1 can always be reached or exceeded
in date t by a public sector decision. Informally, private decisions are inessential if their eﬀects
on social welfare can always be replaced by those of the public sector. The deﬁnition utilizes
the recursive idea that a given social payoﬀ available today, is always available tomorrow if
the political aggregation rule (indexed by θ) is still available.
Example 4a. An extreme case was examined in Section 2. When there is no private
sector (i.e., the totalitarian state), then private decisions are, by deﬁnition, inessential. A less
extreme example is one where u, F, and θ satisfy:
∀ω, ∀e, max
p F (u(ω,e,p),s )=m a x
p,e F (u(ω,e,p),s ) (9)
In other words, the social welfare function, evaluated at the stage game payoﬀs, can achieve
its optimum in each state by varying p alone. In this case, the “absence” of the private sector
need only occur at the optimum. It is straightforward to verify that any dynamic political
game satisfying (9) has an inessential private sector.
15To specialize further, suppose stage payoﬀs can be expressed as ui(ω,z) where z =
max{e1,...,e n,p}. To be concrete, there are public and private internet service providers,
and individuals care only about the one providing the highest quality. If P ⊃ E, then this
satisﬁes (9), and so the private sector is inessential.
Example 4b. Private sector inessentiality may be less exceptional than the previous example
suggests. Consider a case in which all decisions are ﬁltered through the public sector as
follows: let P = En and let BRi(p−i;v)=argmaxpivi(pi,p −i,θ 0) denoting the i’s best response
correspondence given payoﬀ proﬁle, v. Then deﬁne F by
F(v(p,θ
0),s)=−||p − BR(p;v)) ||
2
In this example, the feasible policies are vectors of private decisions. The rule then prescribes
public sector decisions that mimic exactly what each individual would do if the decision for
his private action were his alone, taking as given the actions of others (the “Nash rule”). This
is a case of a rule that decentralizes decision authority, eﬀectively leaving the decisions to the
individuals themselves. Because the rule formally governs all decisions, the private sector is
inessential.13
4.3 Logic of the Result
The conclusion of the Theorem is that in any equilibrium, the type θ is institutionally stable,
i.e., µ(ω,θ)=θ. According to the Theorem, reforms occurs only if either the rule is dynamally
inconsistent or the private sector actions are essential. The Proposition in Section 2 is a special
case.
The logic of the argument is straightforward. Interpret the parameter θ as a player — the
social planner — whose payoﬀ is F(·,θ). We refer to this player as the “institutional type.”
In any state s =( ω,θ), the institutional type θ chooses the public policy p and designates
a subsequent decision maker, type θ0, the following period. A standard result of dynamic
programming is that if type θ faces a single agent decision problem, it need never designate
the decision authority over future policies to another player. Its own choice of policies {pt}
would be optimal in each realized state. To put it another way, Type θ is willing to relinquish
its authority over future decisions only if its designated choice can induce a more favorable
response from actions of others. Consequently, inessentiality of the private sector collapses
the problem to a pure policy — hence single agent — decision problem. The “planner” of
type θ can unilaterally reach any alternative social payoﬀ using policies alone. Hence, this
type need never relinquish decision making authority to another type ˆ θ 6= θ. In such a case,
the policy-path is optimal for type θ if that same type makes decisions each period. The
institutional type θ is therefore stable.
13One can show, however, that this F is not dynamically inconsistent.
165 Recursively Self Selected Institutions
Even if the private sector is essential, change need not occur if the private sector response
matters in a way that favors the current political institution. Moreover, it may be the case
that change may or may not occur because the equilibrium selects “good equilibria” in certain
states and “bad equilibria” in others.
This Section addresses some of these issues. In particular, we assume that all feasible
rules are dynamically consisent and proceed to characterize stability and reform in terms of
a simple incentive compatibility condition, treating institutional types as potential players in
the game.
For any ﬁxed continuation proﬁle, x, and any state s =( ω,θ), one can identify an (n+1)-
player normal form game deﬁned by the following payoﬀs,
(H1(ω,e,p,x),...,H n(ω,e,p,x),F(H(ω,e,p,x),θ ))
Here, each Player i =1 ,...,nis a participant in the original DPG and has payoﬀ Hi(ω,e,p,x).
With payoﬀ F(H(ω,e,p,x),θ), Player n + 1 is the “social planner” of type θ who maximizes
welfare function F(·,θ ). Following a convention in the stochastic games literature, we refer to
this game as an auxiliary game. Let N(s,x) denote the set of Nash equilibria of this auxiliary
game. A standard result establishes that under stated assumptions, N(s,x) is a closed and
nonempty set. Since feasible choice sets are compact, N(s,x) is as well.
Recall that the choice of next period’s institutional type θt+1 is viewed as a strategic
delegation decision. In any auxiliary game, one can view the delegation decision as a choice
between equilibria from the sets N(ω,θ,x) and N(ω, ˆ θ,x) for any pair θ and ˆ θ. However,
multiplicity of equilibrium potentially muddles the comparison. Suppose, for instance, the
current type θt chose θ simply because a “good” equilibrium was subsequently played in
N(ω,θ,x) while a “bad” equilibrium was subsequently played in N(ω, ˆ θ,x). Then θt’s choice
would arise largely come from a coordination failure and little else. To avoid this “modeler’s




F (H(ω,e,p,x),θ ) (10)
Notice that if θ 6= ˆ θ, then type θ is not the institutional player in the auxiliary game.
Consider a continuation proﬁle xθ that deﬁnes a ﬁxed point of the map in (10), i.e, a proﬁle
xθ that satisﬁes:
F(x








Here, F(xθ(ω),θ ) is the largest social welfare for type θ over all possible Nash equilibria of the
auxiliary game with xθ as the continuation proﬁle and with the same type θ as institutional
17Player. Existence of a ﬁxed point problem in (10) is a nontrivial problem14 Yet, ﬁnding a ﬁxed
point xθ is tantamount to ﬁnding a “restricted equilibrium” of the DPG in which µ is required
to be stable, i.e, µ(ω,θ)=θ for all ω. Clearly, if there exists an (unrestricted) equilibrium in
the DPG then there exists a “restricted equilibrium,” and, consequently, a ﬁxed point xθ.
If (10) admits a ﬁxed point, then there exists a function F ∗ deﬁned on arbitrary triples
(ω, ˆ θ, θ)b y
F








The payoﬀ F ∗(ω,ˆ θ,θ) is the largest social welfare for type θ over all possible Nash equilibria
of the auxiliary game in which ˆ θ is the institutional player and xθ is the continuation.
Deﬁnition 3 Type θ is recursively self-selected (RSS) if there exists a function F ∗ deﬁned
by (11) such that for all ω and all ˆ θ,
F
∗(ω,θ, θ) ≥ F
∗(ω, ˆ θ, θ)
Type θ is recursively self-denied (RSD) by type ˆ θ 6= θ if for all ω,
F
∗(ω, ˆ θ, θ) >F
∗(ω,θ, θ)
Recursive self-selection describes an implicit incentive constraint on the institutional types.
A recursively self-selected (RSS) θ is an institutional type that would never delegate decision
authority in the public sector to another type, regardless of the realized state. A recursively
self-denied (RSD) θ is a type that never delegates decision authority to itself in the subsequent
period’s game in any state.
Both RSS and RSD limit consideration only to one-shot delegation decisions, reverting
back to auxiliary games in which type θ is the player thereafter. This restriction is sensible for
checking for an institution’s stability in light of the well-known one-shot deviation principle.
Consequently, it is not diﬃcult to show that if the private sector is inessential in θ, then θ is
RSS. The converse does not generally hold, and so RSS is a weaker condition.
Surprisingly, recursively self-denied types do not necessarily admit reform. Consider, for
example, a dynamic political game with three types: θ1,θ 2,θ 3. Suppose that θ1 is recursively
self-denied by type θ2, which, in turn, is recursively self-denied by type θ3. Suppose that
F ∗(ω,θ1,θ 1) >F ∗(ω,θ3,θ 1), ∀ω, and µ(ω,θ2)=θ3 for all ω.I f δ is close enough to one,
then it can easily be shown that type θ1 is stable. Basically, type θ1 does not delegate to θ2
because θ2 is expected to delegate to θ3 the following period. The failure to induce reform is
due the fact that recursive self-denial is not transitive. Type θ1 would delegate to θ2 if it were
14Results on this can be found in the companion paper, Lagunoﬀ (2005b).
18certain that θ2 were stable. Generally, θ2 cannot commit not to delegate further. The lack of
commitment leads to stability of θ1.
In a related paper, Jack and Lagunoﬀ (2003) construct parametric examples with this
time consistency problem: an elite chooses very conservatively to expand the voting franchise
precisely because a larger franchise subsequently expands rights farther than is desirable for
this elite. In light of these problems, the following result gives suﬃcient (though less than
satisfactory) conditions for reform.
Theorem 2 Fix a DPG in which C is a single valued and dynamically consistent class of
political rules. Suppose the DPG admits at least one equilibrium. Then:
(i) If a rule θ is recursively self-selected, then there exists an equilibrium in which θ is
institutionally stable;
(ii) If a rule θ is recursively self-denied by another rule ˆ θ which is itself recursively-self
selected, then there exists an equilibrium in which θ admits institutional reform.
(iii) If a rule θ is recursively self-denied by every other rule, then there exists an equilibrium
in which θ admits institutional reform.
The result provides two scenarios in which reforms can occur. First, a type admits reform
if it is self-denied by a stable type. In that case, the aforementioned commitment problem
does not arise. Second, a type admits reform if it is self-denied by all other types. In this
case, the public sector is completely ineﬀective. So much so, that any form of delegation is
preferred by type θ.
In both scenarios, future private sector decisions compensate for the loss of control by type
θ in the policy arena. The best outcome from type θ’s point of view is one where it delegates
decision authority to another type. In order to induce the preferred alternative, the social
planner must “buy-oﬀ” the private sector by delegating future decision authority to another
“type” ˆ θ 6= θ. The delegation represents a strategic commitment in which a type cedes control
over public decisions to gain more favorable treatment from decisions over which it is has no
direct control. Hence, “Player” θ designates a new “player”, ˆ θ, in order to elicit the desired
response from the private sector.
6 An Example
Consider a modiﬁcation of Example 2a in Section 2 in which private sector behavior plays a
role. In this example, based largely on an example in Jack and Lagunoﬀ (JL) (2003, Section
195.1), ui = ωt +yi(1− pt)− e2
it where eit is eﬀort at date t. The state evolves deterministically
according to ωt+1 =( pt
P
j yj)γ P
j ejt with 0 <γ<1. In Example 2a, next period’s public
good ωt+1 was produced from this period’s tax revenue, pt
P
j yj, generated from a ﬁxed asset
such as land. The policy instrument was a ﬂat tax pt on land value. In the present example,
tax revenue combines with aggregate eﬀort to produce a public good. A concrete example is
public literacy. Everyone values general literacy, but it requires both public investment and
individual eﬀort.
As before, the land holdings of the n individuals are ordered according to y1 < ···<y n.
For convenience, let y1 > 0 and extend the class of rules as follows. Deﬁne C to behave as
if the current political rule were a “dictator” with wealth anywhere in the interval [y1,y n].
Consequently, θ ∈ [y1,y n].
An equilibrium is found as follows. Let π be any Markov strategy, and s =( ω,θ) the
current state. The recursive payoﬀ function of both policy and eﬀort is (1−δ)[ω+yi(1−p)−
e2
i]+δVi(s0;π) in which ω0 is determined technologically and θ0 is chosen by θ = yi ∈ [y1,y n].
Claim Institutional type θ = y1 is the unique, recursively self selected political rule. Any
other type θ with y1 <θ≤ yn is recursively self denied by some other type θ0 <θ . Finally, if
























1+δ − δ¯ µ1/(2γ−1)
1 − δ¯ µ1/(2γ−1)
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1 − δ¯ µ2γ/(2γ−1)
1+δ − δ¯ µ2γ/(2γ−1)
#
(13)
The Claim asserts properties of RSS and RSD rules. Apart from these properties, the
equilibrium is largely the same as the one derived in JL. Figure 1 illustrates the simple
dymamics of the equilibrium institutional rule. In Figure 1, a unique stable political rule,
θ = y1 (in the Figure, y1 is small) is reached in ﬁnitely many periods. Intuitively, rich policy
makers are recursively self-denied by poorer ones because the rich policy maker’s chosen tax
rate is too small to induce much private investment in literacy from the population.
To verify the Claim, observe ﬁrst that the state enters linearly in the stage payoﬀ. This
means that a more convenient expression of the recursive payoﬀ function can be derived by
grouping the subsequent period’s state with the current stage payoﬀ. Deﬁne V ∗
i (s; π) ≡






















θt = yi θt+1 θt+2 θt+3
Rule at
t +1
Political Rule at t
Figure 1: A Linear Rule in Land Holdings
out. Consequently, V ∗ does not vary with ω and can be expressed a function of θ alone. The






Fixing θ = yi, the ﬁrst order conditions in p and ei imply the policy and private sector
strategies of the form in (12). Notice that if γ>1/2 then tax rates and private eﬀort increase
in the wealth, θ, of the (implicit) dictator. If γ<1/2 then tax rates and eﬀort decrease in θ.
With strategies in (12), the recursive payoﬀ used by the current dictator is
V
∗










where A ≡ 1
4(2n − 1)δ2C2γ(p
P
j yj)2γ, a positive constant.












It follows that when θ = yi is the institutional type, then
F
∗(ω,ˆ θ,θ)=( 1− δ)
h










Now evaluate dF ∗(ω, ˆ θ,θ)/dˆ θ = 0. A solution is given by linear function, ˆ θ =
n
2n−1θ.
Hence, we have shown that institutional type θ is recursively self denied by any institutional
21type θ0 ∈ [ n
2n−1θ,θ). Since types are RSD only by lower types, it follows that the lowest
type y1 is recursively self selected, hence (by Theorem 2) stable. It also follows that all types
θ ∈ (y1, 2n−1
n y1] admit reform.
To ﬁnd the equilibrium institutional rule, µ, we guess and verify a linear solution θ0 =¯ µθ.
















Taking ﬁrst order conditions and substituting for C and A, we verify that θ0 =¯ µθ is an
equilibrium for ¯ µ that satisﬁes (13). It remains to show that a solution to (13) exists. To
verify this ﬁnal step, observe that as ¯ µ varies from 0 to 1, the left side (13) is continuously
increasing from 0 to 1; the right side of (13) is continously decreasing from n/(2n − 1) and
approaches 0 asymptotically. Hence, by the Intermediate Value Theorem, a solution ¯ µ ∈ (0,1)
exists.
7 Summary
This paper introduces a dynamic recursive framework in which political institution are instru-
mental objects of choice each period. It is shown how the framework may be used evaluate
questions of institutional stability and/or reform and equilibrium existence.
Political institutions are shown to be stable if they are dynamically consistent and the
private sector is inessential or if rule is recursively self-selected. Alternatively, political in-
stitutions are shown to admit reform if the rule is recursively self-denied by a stable rule or
by all rules. Clearly, the “intermediate” environments where the private sector is sometimes
essential and rules are sometimes self selected are obvious focal points for future work.
In general, dynamic, recursive models of political aggregation are not new. One of the
ﬁrst is the pioneering work of Krusell, Quadrini, and R´ ıos-Rull (1997). More recent examples
include Klein, Krusell, and R´ ıos-Rull (2002) and Hassler, et. al. (2003).15 In this literature
the institution itself is ﬁxed. Usually, some form of majority voting is assumed, and so the
“political ﬁxed point” problem outlined above can be resolved in certain cases when the policy
space is single dimensional.
A few papers examine dynamic models of voting that speciﬁcally allow for multi-dimensional
choice spaces (though keeping the voting mechanism ﬁxed). These include Bernheim and
Nataraj (2002), Kalandrakis (2002), and Banks and Duggan (2003).
15See Persson and Tabellini (2001) for other references.
22The present framework in necessarily multi-dimensional. The political ﬁxed point problem
is compounded by fact that diﬀerent institutions each have possibly distinct requirements
achieving recursive consistency. Nevertheless, under certain conditions, the problem is resolved
when political rules are dynamically consistent.
Theorems 1 and 2 are a ﬁrst step toward unifying a small but growing literature on
dynamically endogenous institutions. Primarily, this literature concerns progressive expansion
of voting rights. Under the “external conﬂict” explanation of Acemoglu and Robinson (2000),
the voting franchise historically was extended by an elite to head oﬀ social unrest. In their
model there are only two types: a restricted voting franchise of the elite and a full, universal
manhood suﬀrage. Public decisions in the restricted franchise may be undercut by the threat
of revolt. Consequently, the political state of the restricted franchise was self-denied by the
stable state of the universal franchise.16
According to the “internal conﬂict” explanation of Lizzeri and Persico (2002), rights are
extended to gain support when there is ideological or class conﬂict among the elite. Jack
and Lagunoﬀ (2003) construct an example of this in which taxes sustain investment in public
literacy. Conﬂict between the median voter within the elite, and the population median
individual’s private investment in literacy leads to an expansion of voting rights. A variant of
this example with “delegated dictatorship” is presented in Section 7.
There are, of course, many cases in which political rules are dynamically inconsistent. One
useful set of examples is the set of wealth-weighted “voting” schemes examined by Jordan
(2002). These rules give rise to dynamically inconsistent choice because they vary with current
income distribution. Jordan characterizes the (static) core and stability of the “wealth-is-
power” rule whereby policies are entirely determined by those with the most wealth.
There are also many more cases in which political rules are neither recursively self-selected
or self-denied. So far, we produce no general results on these intermediate cases. Nevertheless,
the intuition above suggests that reform or stability depends on a clearer understanding of
the incentive constraints on the institutional “types.” Endless possibilities exist for future
research.
8 Appendix
Proof of Theorem 1 Fix a dynamic political game and a political state θ. Suppose that
private decisions are inessential in state θ. Fix an equilibrium π =( σ,ψ,µ ). We proceed to
16Though it is not a model of endogenous institutions per se, Powell (2003) constructs a dynamic game
in which a temporarily weak government may lack credibility to induce another government to restrain its
ineﬃcient use of power such as launching a coup or attacking.
23show that there will be no political reform in any economic state ω, i.e., µ(ω,θ)=θ for all ω.
Since C is single valued and dynamically consistent, there is some social criterion F that
rationalizes C and is invariant to the economic states ω. By deﬁnition,








Inessentiality of private decisions means that for each ω0, and each continuation x, for any
private proﬁle e there exists a public sector policy p such that (8) holds. In particular, choose
some ˆ θ 6= θ and let x(·)=V (·, ˆ θ; π). Given some ω0, let e = σ(ω0,θ). Using the deﬁnition of




























































= F(V (ω0,θ;π),θ )
(17)
The ﬁrst equality in (17) follows from the deﬁnition of feasible continuation x. The ﬁrst
inequality follows by Inessentiality of the private sector. The next two equalities follow from
the deﬁnitions of payoﬀ proﬁle H and by x, respectively. The second (and last) inequality is
obvious. The last two equalities follow from the deﬁnitions of equilibrium and the construction








24However, since (18) holds for each economic state ω0 and since ˆ θ is arbitrary, it follows that














Using dynamic consistency and Equation (19), we ﬁnd that for all ˆ θ 6= θ,
F (U(ω,θ;π)(ψ(ω,θ),θ),θ)



















Hence, we have shown that µ(ω,θ)=θ satisﬁes (20). But because C is single valued, it is
the only such solution. Consequently, µ must satisfy µ(ω,θ)=θ. We therefore conclude that
inessentiality of private decisions implies no political reform.
Proof of Theorem 2, Part (i).
The following deﬁnition will prove useful for subsequent results.
Deﬁnition 4 An equilibrium π is institutionally optimal for θ∗ if for any other equilibrium
ˆ π and for each s =( ω,θ),
F(V (ω,µ(s); π),θ
∗) ≥ F(V (ω, ˆ µ(s); ˆ π),θ
∗) (21)
The institutionally optimal equilibrium is the one that generates the most preferred social
welfare for type θ∗ in each state among all equilibria. The idea behind institutional optimality
extends the best-case comparison to the full dynamic model. Clearly, if an equilibrium exists,
then it is clear from the deﬁnition that an institutionally optimal one exists as well.
We show that if θ is recursively self selected, then there exists an institutionally opti-
mal equilibrium in which θ is stable. Let π =( σ,ψ,µ ) denote any institutionally optimal
25equilibrium. Now let µ∗ denote an institutional strategy that satisﬁes:
µ∗(ω,ˆ θ)=µ(ω,ˆ θ), ∀ω, ∀ˆ θ 6= θ, and,
µ∗(ω,θ)=θ, ∀ω,
Clearly, µ∗ diﬀers from µ in that it is stable in political state θ.
Choose some ˆ θ 6= θ. Fix an arbitrary ω0 in the full measure set on which recursive self
selection holds. We will proceed to verify that the following string of equalities and inequalities
hold.
F(V (ω,θ;π),θ )




















































∗(ω, ˆ θ, θ)









0| ω,σ(ω,ˆ θ),ψ(ω,ˆ θ))









0| ω,σ(ω,ˆ θ),ψ(ω, ˆ θ))






























V (ω, ˆ θ;π),θ
￿
(22)
The string in equalities and inequalities in (22) are justiﬁed as follows. The ﬁrst equality
(second expression) in (22) follows by deﬁnition of V (ω,θ;π) and dynamic consistency of
F. The ﬁrst inequality (in the third expression) follows by deﬁnition of equilibrium. The
second equality (fourth expression) follows again by the deﬁnition of V (ω,θ;π) and dynamic
consistency of F (applied recursively). The second inequality (ﬁfth expression) follows by again
by deﬁnition of equilibrium applied recursively. The third inequality follows by repeating
the above substitutions recursively and iterating forward. The fourth inequality (seventh
expression) follows by recursive self selection (RSS) of θ. The third equality (eighth expression)
expands the expression using dynamic consistency. The ﬁfth and sixth inequalities (nineth
and tenth expressions, resp.) follows from the (recursive) application of the hypothesis that θ
is RSS. The last inequality (and last expression) follows by iterating forward.
Using the same argument as in the Proof of Theorem 1 after Inequality (18 and to the end
of Expression (20), we ﬁnd that
F (U(ω,θ;π)(ψ(ω,θ),µ




or, equivalently, by dynamic consistency
(1 − δ)F (u(ω,σ(ω,θ),ψ(ω,θ)),θ )+δ
R
F (V (ω0,µ ∗(ω,θ); π),θ )dq(ω0| ω,σ(ω,θ),ψ(ω,θ))

















we can, by dynamic consistency, iteratively substitute µ∗ in place of µ. Iterating forward in
this way, we show π =( σ,ψ,µ ∗) is, in fact, an equilibrium in which θ is stable.
Parts (ii) and (iii) of Theorem 2.
Suppose that θ is recursively self denied (RSD) by either (a) another recursively self selected
(RSS) type, or (b) every other type. Our proof works for both cases. Once again, let π be
an institutionally optimal equilibrium. Suppose, by contradiction, that θ is stable in π, i.e.,
µ(ω,θ)=θ for almost all ω. Since θ is RSD by either (a) a RSS type ˆ θ, or by (b) every type







∗ (ω,θ, θ), ∀ω.
Since π is assumed stable, i.e., µ(ω,θ)=θ on a set of ω with full measure, ﬁx a state ω in
that set. Then we verify that the following string of equalities and inequalities hold.
F(V (ω,θ; π),θ)

































∗(ω,ˆ θ, θ )
=( 1 − δ)F
￿







0| ω,σ(ω,ˆ θ),ψ(ω,ˆ θ))
< (1 − δ)F
￿







0| ω,σ(ω,ˆ θ),ψ(ω,ˆ θ))
< (1 − δ)F
￿




























V (ω, ˆ θ;π),θ
￿
(24)
The string in equalities and inequalities are justiﬁed as follows. The ﬁrst equality (second
expression) in (24) follows by deﬁnition and dynamic consistency of F. The second equality
(in the third expression) follows from the hypothesis that the equilibrium π is stable in θ.
The third equality (fourth expression) follows by recursive application of this hypothesis. The
fourth equality (ﬁfth expression) follows by iterative application of this hypothesis and the
deﬁnition of F ∗. The ﬁrst inequality (sixth expression) follows by the hypothesis that θ is
RSD by ˆ θ. The second inequality inequality (seventh expression) follows from the recursive
application of the hypothesis that θ is RSD. Notice here that if ˆ θ is itself RSS then the
equilibrium is either stable in ˆ θ, i.e, µ(ω0, ˆ θ)=ˆ θ (such an equilibrium exists by the previous




>F ∗ (ω0,θ, θ) for all ω0. Otherwise, π
could not have been institutionally optimal due to the availability of the ˆ θ-stable equilibrium.
Of course, if θ is RSD against every other type ˆ θ, then clearly θ is RSS against µ(ω0, ˆ θ).
The third equality (eighth expression) applies the prior reasoning (that θ is RSD by either ˆ θ
which is itself RSS or by every other type) recursively. Finally, the last inequality (and last
expression) follows by iterating forward.
From (24) we therefore conclude
F
￿
V (ω, ˆ θ; π),θ
￿
>F (V (ω,θ; π),θ)
29And, since ω was chosen arbitrarily (from a full measure set), it follows that on a set of ω













But this clearly contradicts the supposition that µ(ω,θ)=θ is an equilibrium institutional
rule.
We conclude that µ(ω,θ) 6= θ on a set ω with positive measure, and so θ admits institutional
reform in π =( σ,ψ,µ ).
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